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Abstract 
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to provide a platform for development of an ontology 
supporting failure analysis of surface safety valves (SSVs) which will enable the technical dialogue 
between oil & gas operators, engineering companies and original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) 
when dealing with component failures. 
Design/Methodology/Approach – The paper describes the use of a functional modelling based 
ontology in support of root cause analysis (RCA) which combined with the use of a defined definition 
for failure concepts and a complete database of these concepts relevant to surface safety valves can be 
applied to characterize degradation at the design stage. An examination of this new methodology was 
performed through the creation of a case study applying this new method on a hydraulically actuated 
surface safety valve. 
Findings – The paper identifies a continuing problem with failure analysis; not just from a technical 
dimension, but it also encompasses elements related to organisational behaviour and culture and the 
stakeholders involved in dealing with failure of equipment in service. In today’s digital operations and 
maintenance activities, addressing the challenge of failure analysis from only one dimension has 
proven to be unfeasible with significant downtime still occurring in many operations.  
Originality/value – The overall value is a detailed picture of ontology capable of enabling the 
technical dialogue between operators, engineering companies and OEMs 
Keywords Surface safety valves, Maintenance, Faults, Functional failures, Causes, Mechanisms, 
Symptoms, Through-life engineering services, Maintenance Effectiveness Reviews.  
Paper type Research paper 
  
Introduction 
The oil and gas industry relies on a lot of different equipment when operating a well. One of 
the most vital components in these systems is the surface safety valve. This is a hydraulically 
or pneumatically actuated single acting swab-gate valve with the function to isolate the 
wellhead from further production equipment down the line. Surface safety valves are found in 
so called Xmas trees, which are situated on top of the wellhead and serve to route the flow of 
oil or gas to the different production systems (example shown in Figure 1). Surface safety 
valves function by monitoring the pressure in the main pipeline and triggering an automatic 
shutting of the valve mechanism in case of pressure readings which are outside of allowed 
norms. (EXPRO International Group , 2019) 
 
 
Figure 1: A surface safety valve (red) on an Xmas tree 
Typically, surface safety valves lasts for a long period, with life cycles up to 20 years (FMC 
Technologies, 2007) . Despite this, unanticipated breakdown of critical systems still occurs 
regularly. The reasons as to why are unclear however. Whilst some data is available on failure 
rates of valves, oil and gas operators are unwilling to share their information on causes of 
these failures due to the influence these databases could have on the stock prices of the 
company, or do not possess any database on this topic at all. From the little data that has been 
released to the public domain, such as OREDA – offshore and onshore reliability data, it has 
been found in previous research that valves contribute up to 52% of failures in Xmas tress 
(Stendebakken, 2014). 
 Current maintenance practises are fairly basic, with most components working on a run-to-
failure principle with periodic visual inspections to determine if any leakages have occurred 
or if damage is visible, combined with quarterly valve shutting tests which are applied to 
determine whether the valve is still above the limit of safe operation. (David, 2014). Practices 
such as do not take into account why the valve no longer complies with the minimum 
requirements for safe operation, nor is this ever inspected.  
 
Another problem the industry faces is the lack of commonly used, standardized set of 
taxonomy. Certain terms and concepts such as cause, mechanism, fault and symptoms are not 
universally defined with different standards being set (ISO-14224, ISO-20815, IEC-60812, 
etc.). Because of this, there is another barrier between oil and gas operators and OEMs in 
determining the true cause for failure in surface safety valves and characterizing the 
degradation that causes these failures. 
 
All these factors contribute to an industry where there is a lot of room for improvement of 
maintenance practices, and a great opportunity to reduce total maintenance costs ( Shaipov, 
2018). Because of the high risk and crucial nature of surface safety valves, preventive 
maintenance actions are strongly recommended for implementation (Hooiveld, 2018). 
 
With the goal in mind of lessening the issues described above plaguing the oil and gas 
industry the research that resulted in this paper was started with a number of objectives: 
 
(I) To work towards the development of an ontology for failure analysis of surface safety 
valves which will enable the technical dialogue between oil and gas operators, 
engineering companies and original equipment manufacturers when dealing with 
component failures. 
(II) To propose a proven methodology which, using the developed ontology, would 
improve the ability of oil and gas original equipment manufacturers in better 
identifying and characterizing degradation of surface safety valves at the design 
stage. 
 
This paper proposes a methodology implementing failure mode, effect and criticality analysis 
(FMECA) with the use of functional modelling techniques and a common database of failure 
concepts, categorized in the four definitions of cause, mechanism, fault and symptom. Whilst 
FMECA is already a well-accepted method of risk assessment in many industries as well as 
oil and gas, the application of functional modelling to characterize these systems and their 
degradation at the design stage brings a unique opportunity to improve designs and implement 
better and more efficient preventive maintenance measures (Hawkins P. , 1998) with these 
techniques having been successfully implemented in the aerospace industry (Stecki, 2009) 
This paper concludes with a case study demonstrating the implementation of the proposed 
methodology with the aim of proving the ability for this methodology to produce FMECAs 
and the advantages that a model based approach gives, such as a high level of consistency and 
detail, and the ability to characterize and predict degradation without the need for a physical 
testing setup. 
 
Findings: Surface safety valves (SSVs) are critical components of oil and gas wellheads that currently 
make use of fairly basic maintenance planning and reliability assessment which can result is a lot of 
unnecessary costs for oil and gas operators due to longer downtime and unexpected failures. 
  
Background 
The demand for Xmas trees is directly proportional to the demand for fossil fuels. In other 
words, the more wells are drilled, the more Xmas trees are required. During periods when oil 
suffers a significant price increase, fewer wells are drilled. This however, does not seriously 
affect Xmas trees manufacturers because they typically have significant backlogs of orders 
and limited production capacities. 
 
The leaders of the surface equipment market are Cameroon, FMC and BHGE. These 
companies control more than 60% of the manufacturing of surface equipment. FMC has been 
the leader in the Middle East for many years, Cameroon has been working a lot in United 
Arab Emirates (UAE), and BHGE has been taking a significant lead in Qatar. 
 
Companies like Cameroon have large distribution centres that enable them to react quickly 
when its customers need a critical spare. They also provide 365 days per year support. 
Whereas other companies do not have such stock and they manufacture the parts needed 
when they receive an order. Because of this, the lead time for a hydraulic valve can be as high 
as six months. 
 
In a study done by The IHS Global Inc (IHS) in five onshore regions in the U.S, the total 
capital costs of onshore oil wells is calculated by using the values of the drilling and the 
installation, the land acquisition and the costs of the processing and the transportation. The 
total expenditure by adding all the factors is between $4.9 million and $8.3 million. This 
amount includes the completion costs that generally has a price from $2.9 million to $5.6 
million per well. 
 
The graphic in Figure 2 below shows the five essential cost for drilling and completing a 
typical onshore well in the U.S. 
 
 Figure 2: Pie chart of costs for operating a typical well in the US (Hartley, 2005). 
 
If focus is put on the cost of the equipment which represents 24% of the total costs. it can be 
assumed that a standard configuration Xmas tree costs more or less $100k. This price can 
increase significantly by the non-standard size of the machine, the material and the size of the 
order. With bigger orders, it is possible to obtain better prices and shorter lead times because 
the order will be prioritised.  
 
Findings: The oil and gas industry is a sector with high costs associated to all aspects of its business. 
This relates to the reluctance to divulge information as described in the introduction, with oil and gas 
stakeholders being reluctant to share information due to possibility of affecting share prices. These 
high costs also relate to the reluctance to perform tests on actual equipment, due to the high 
manufacturing costs. 
 
-  
 
  
Definition of failure concepts 
Failure concepts are situations, occurrences or phenomena that define the ways in which a 
system might experience potential failure. When investigating the standards used in the oil 
and gas industry, there appears to be a scattered and differentiating nature in the taxonomy 
used, with different definitions for the same concept, these concepts are catalogued below in 
Table 1 through the use of four categories: Causes, Mechanisms, Faults and Symptoms 
(CMFS). These categories were employed in the process to define clear terminology that 
could have a positive effect on the conversation between oil & gas operators and OEMs by 
having clear definitions that allow for a better understanding between companies. 
An extensive literature review was performed where a number of industry standards, such as 
ISO – 14224 and other research papers were catalogued in these categories of CMFS to have 
a better understanding of the meaning of each concept and their use in this paper. 
Table 1: Failure Concept definitions 
Term Definition Source 
Cause The fundamental reason for a failure mode, which 
may see the physical degradation or process leading 
to a failure mode. A cause can relate to design, 
manufacture, environmental, operational or 
maintenance actions or an input flow that exceeds 
specified limits. 
 
S.D. Rudov-Clark and J.Stecki. 
2009 
 
 
 
 
 
Circumstances during design, manufacture or use 
which have led to a failure 
 
ISO – 14224 
 
 
Failure Cause. Failure causes are the reasons “why” 
a failure event occurred. Failure causes may be quite 
obscure and not immediately apparent, and may 
require significant investigation, or root cause 
analysis for the underlying reasons to be revealed. 
Allen S. B. Tam and Ian 
Gordon. 2009 
Set of circumstances that leads to a failure 
  
ISO-20815 
  
Mechanism The chemical, electrical, mechanical or software 
processes which cause physical degradation of a 
system element and results in a fault. 
S.D. Rudov-Clark and J.Stecki. 
2009 
The failure mechanism is the physical, chemical or 
other process or combination of processes that leads 
to the failure. It is an attribute of the failure event that 
can be deduced technically, e.g. the apparent, 
observed cause of the failure. 
ISO – 14224  
 
 
Failure Mechanism. This term describes “how” the 
equipment failed – and specifically refers to the 
physical, chemical or other process or mechanism 
that produced the failure event. 
 
Allen S. B. Tam and Ian 
Gordon. 2009 
 
An attribute of the failure event that can be easily 
deduced technically. The failure mechanism is the 
apparent, immediate cause of the failure and is 
related to the lowest level in the hierarchy where it 
can be identified.  
OREDA – Offshore & Onshore 
Reliability Data Volume I. 
2015 
Fault Commonly used as a synonym for failure mode, 
however in MADe the term fault refers specifically 
to the physically degraded state of a system element 
(static) or a change in behaviour (dynamic) that 
which will result in a failure mode. 
S.D. Rudov-Clark and J.Stecki. 
2009 
 
 
 
State of an item characterized by inability to perform 
a required function, excluding such inability during 
preventive maintenance or other planned actions, or 
due to lack of external resources 
ISO – 14224  
 
 
 
A state resulting from failure. Rausand, M & Øien, K. 1996. 
 
Failure Effect. Failure effect is the immediate 
outcome that a failure event had upon the operation, 
function or status of the equipment. This failure 
effect is something that would be observable by a 
human operator, or detectable by instrumentation. 
This Information indicates that the equipment is not 
functioning as expected, or according to its 
specifications. 
 
Allen S. B. Tam and Ian 
Gordon. 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The termination or degradation of the ability of an 
item to perform its required functions, it includes: 
• Complete failure of the item 
• Failure of parts of the item that causes 
unavailability of the item for corrective 
action. 
• Failure discovered during inspection, testing 
or preventive maintenance that requires 
repair. 
Failure in safety devices or control/monitoring 
devices that necessitates shutdown or reduction of 
the item’s capability below a specified limit. 
OREDA – Offshore & Onshore 
Reliability Data Volume I. 
2015 
State of an item characterized by the inability to 
perform a required function, excluding the inability 
during preventive maintenance or other planned 
actions, or due to lack of external resources. 
IEC 60812  
inability of an item to perform as required, due to an 
internal state. 
 
 
 
  
ISO-20815 
Symptom Failure symptoms are indicators or signs of a failure 
event. These indicators or signs may manifest before 
the event occurs, or after the event occurs. 
Allen S. B. Tam and Ian Goron. 
2009 
 The response of a failed system element that can be 
used to detect a failure mode, or a loss generated by 
a failure process that can be used to detect a failure 
mode. 
S.D. Rudov-Clark and J.Stecki. 
2009 
  
After reviewing these definitions, the concepts as defined by S.D. Rudov-Clark and J. Stecki. 
2009, are selected for use. Mainly due to their use in the software package used during the 
case study that was performed for this paper, the fact that this standard defines all four of the 
failure concepts unlike most other sources and their clear, precice and relevant description of 
these concepts. 
 
Findings: The taxonomy used in the oil & gas industry lacks standardization, which makes straight 
comparisons of datasets from different operators difficult. By taking these different definitions, 
compiling and comparing them, a platform is provided to allow for technical dialogue between 
operators and OEMs by allowing them to bridge the gap in different standards that are used by 
different companies.  
A brief history of standards, recommended practices and guidelines addressing the technical 
risk, reliability and asset integrity 
Preventive maintenance programs help to ensure that the well remains viable, which means 
that it continues producing viable quantities of oil past its expected lifetime. These systems 
with a lack of maintenance, may stop working or even worse, have catastrophic consequences 
due to a failure of the equipment.  
To complete a certification of a wellhead and a Xmas tree, there are reliability assessment 
methods that the system need to pass: 
In order to verify the design of a valve of 20-year life the OEMs do an endurance cycle test. 
This test for the standard valves requires pressure/temperature testing with a total of 200 
cycles, and for the gate valves it test beyond the 300 cycles, arriving to a test of 500 cycles.  
OEMs confirm that with proper maintenance, valves are designed to work 20 years under the 
most extreme conditions. (FMC Technologies, 2007) 
The next inspection, which is for the well, serves to ensure that the installed equipment 
complies with the established safety and environmental standards. This survey includes: 
• Part numbers and serial numbers, size, pressure rating, materials 
• Condition of the well 
• Configuration of Xmas tree and wellhead 
• Well location 
• Manufacturer 
• Annulus pressure 
• Seal isolation tests  
• Pictures of the equipment 
(CAMERON, Schlumberger, 2019) 
 
This field survey allows the operators to identify the critical maintenance items. By a visual 
inspection and well bore and annulus pressure and temperature readings operators know if the 
wellhead is affected by leaks, component deterioration, breakage or a missing part. This 
critical items are reported on a review with recommendations of how to proceed to repair 
them. The least problematic instances are when a component can be repaired without 
removing it. A skilled maintenance technician can quickly perform reparation of the annulus 
pressure or flushing a stuck gate, and obtain good results. Whereas, instances that require a 
replacement have problems in finding the same component, because some of them are 
obsolete and consequently are not available any more.  In this situation, there are two options: 
find a pattern part manufacturer or reverse engineer the part from scratch.  
At the end of the survey, OEMs will develop a well database with the information captured 
and a well schematic. Depending on the results obtained, OEMs will provide a maintenance 
plan to ensure a proper functioning of the system. A few examples of the typical variables that 
are recorded and monitored in each inspection are as follows: 
• Functional testing of wellhead and tree gate valves (number of turns to open/close the 
valve) 
• Pressure testing of tubing hanger and all casing hanger voids 
• Pressure testing of the tree valves 
• Actuator closure times and function testing (reaction time) 
(Dale, Heskins, & Bolton, 2010) 
An example of an inspection routine as described in this section is shown in Figure 3 and 
Figure 4. It is important to collect all the information into a report to maintain a record of 
these periodic readings. These data will allow the company to monitor the gradual 
deterioration of the parts or avoid an increase in a particular location of the pressure. 
 
Figure 3: Flowchart for a routine maintenance inspection 
  
 
 
The next wellhead certification program is the Certification of Fitness for Service for 
Wellheads and Xmas Trees Under Flowing Conditions. This evaluates the condition of the 
wellhead and the Xmas tree and inspects if there are any external leaks. The inspection is 
done without disrupting the regular operation. All the data like the part numbers, the annulus 
pressure or the configuration of the wellhead and the Xmas tree is recorded in a file to provide 
traceability. If the evaluation of the system does not indicate pressure release or mechanical 
damage, the company delivers a certificate of conformance that contains the condition of the 
wellhead and the Xmas tree, and that certifies the “Fitness for Service, No Pressure Release to 
Atmosphere”. This certification includes the annulus pressure recording, the greasing of the 
annulus valves and an evaluation of the system with a picture, the service life of the 
equipment, the established age and the components. 
(CAMERON, Schlumberger, 2019) 
  
Figure 4: Flowchart of remedial actions to be taken depending on pass or fail of inspection (Dale, Heskins, & 
Bolton, 2010) 
The last certification can only be done after the well is secured and shut in. Its name is 
Certification of Wellhead and Xmas Tree Integrity Under Shut-In Conditions. It tests the 
integrity of the tubing hanger seals and includes:  
• A wellhead inspection 
• Full greasing of all valves 
• Check the pressure integrity on all voids 
• Test of wellhead seals  
• Rectification of pressure integrity and mechanical issues  
(CAMERON, Schlumberger, 2019) 
There are a lot of possible failures in a Xmas tree, If any component of the Xmas tree has an 
unexpected failure, the performance will decrease, or even worse, the production could come 
to a halt. Other problems associated with a fault would be that the repair time of a component 
is between 80 and 100 hours( (Faichnie, 2019) . If this part cannot be repaired, the new 
component lead time is six months. Finally, the last factor is the high cost that the company 
need to pay for a replacement part. (Faichnie, 2019) 
 
Findings: Current maintenance practices and standards are numerous and can be quite extensive. 
Whilst these methods might detect an obvious failure as it is about to occur, or after it has occurred, 
they fall short when it comes to preventive maintenance. Failures are only recorded and tracked when 
the component needs repair, nor is the cause determined. As such, a lot of room for improvement is 
available to take more preventative measures by characterizing the degradation of components and 
implementing more efficient downtime and maintenance times.  
  
Proposed methodology for analysing technical risk, reliability and asset integrity 
This paper proposes a functional modelling methodology that allows for characterization of 
degradation at the design stage. Through this, better preventive maintenance measures can be 
taken and degradation anticipated to reduce issues such as lead time and allow for 
implementation of countermeasures such as Condition and Performance Monitoring (CPM) 
measures. These measure will allow the company to increase the production and anticipate 
possible failures that will help them to avoid unexpected operational problems. This method 
already has a current popular application in the aerospace industry (Scheuren, Caldwell, 
Goodman, & Wegman, 1998) and has the potential to improve the oil & gas industry as well.  
Functional level modelling is a methodology where each component of a system or subsystem 
is described purely in terms of the function(s) that it performs to ensure the operation of the 
system. Such a methodology is key in the design stage to clearly define the architecture used 
in the system that is being modelled and is an asset in further steps of the design process, such 
as concepting, designing or selecting components and requirements of the system. The 
definitions of these basic functions may vary between designers, for this reason, catalogues 
and definitions such as those by Stone and Wood (Stone & Wood, Development of a 
Functional Basis for Design, 2000) are used that employ a functional decomposition, 
generalizing them to a set of terms that can apply to any system on a functional level, 
regardless of context. An example set of definitions, as given in (Stone & Wood, 
Development of a Functional Basis for Design, 2000) is given in Figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 5: Functions definitions for functional modelling (Stone & Wood, Development of a Functional Basis for Design, 2000) 
To create a complete functional model, defining the input and output relations between 
components is also necessary, this is done through the use of flows. These represent the 
dynamic interaction between components, but have been described as a representation of 
bonds between components as well (Stone & Wood, Development of a Functional Basis for 
Design, 2000). In their most raw form, flows represent the transfer of energy, matter or 
information between components, as well as the transformation or other changes a flow 
experiences when interacting with a component, e.g. An electric motor converts the flow from 
electrical energy into mechanical energy. These flows can have both a positive and negative 
effect on the output flows. An example of flow definitions is given in Figure 6 and an 
example of a functional flow diagram is shown in Figure 7.  
 
Figure 6: Flow definitions for functional modelling (Stone & Wood, Development of a Functional Basis for Design, 2000) 
 
Figure 7: Functions and flows used together to define a component 
  
Using the methodologies of functions and flows to break down a system to its most basic 
level gives engineers the opportunity to clarify the capabilities and limits of the system at the 
design stage through the use of a Functional Block Diagram. An example of such a functional 
block diagram is given in Figure 8, With the use of function and flow definitions as used by 
Stone and Wood, this breakdown shows the functionality of a manual pump using the terms 
of the generalized catalogue shown in Figure 5 and Figure 6, and demonstrates how this 
methodology combined with proper terminology allows for a consistent level of detail in 
system modelling and functional description. 
 
Figure 8: Example of a functional block diagram 
 
A different approach to modelling components is through the use of part level modelling, 
where the component is not described only through the use of functions and flows, but also in 
terms of the parts that a component contains. These parts are defined by describing their 
characteristics in terms of the features it has (e.g. a hole, a thread, etc.), and the connections 
that this part has to other parts. These connections are further defined through the use of the 
same functional definitions shown in Figure 5 and Figure 6, with an example of part level 
modelling shown in Figure 9.The use of part level modelling comes into play when analysing 
the overall effect each part and their connections has on the component that it is in. An 
example of this is how failure of the connection between a rubber seal ring and the 
component it is connected to in a pipeline might cause leakage, which would hamper the 
function of the pipeline to transport its designated material. 
 Figure 9: Part level modelling example 
To create these part level models and ensure that the connections, features and functions are 
defined as accurately to the component being modelled, typically a part pair breakdown is 
created. This is breakdown very similar in function to the part level model itself, where each 
part is given features and connections. Showing how each part interacts with each other part 
in the system. This is usually summed up in a table. This method exists mainly as a 
preparatory step for creating a part level model, and to streamline the part level modelling 
process. An example of a part pair breakdown, as used in the case study in this paper, is 
shown in Appendix A. 
The final aspect of the proposed methodology is the addition of Fault Tree Diagrams (FTD), 
which show the relation between Causes, Mechanisms, Faults and Symptoms (CMFS) as 
defined in Chapter II and the component that it is being applied to. In a functional model, 
each component has a separate FTD which shows these (CMFS) along with the probability 
that they will occur, as well as the progression rate it occurs at and how they might affect the 
component, or in the case of symptoms, show what is affecting the component. An example 
of a FTD is shown in Figure 10.  
 Figure 10: Fault Tree Diagram example 
 
When implementing FTDs on a part level model, a slightly different approach is taken, where 
the diagram is broken up into different sub-trees for each part in a component. These sub-
diagrams are related to the functional failure of connections between different part pairs, with 
variables such as probability defining the chance of failure occurrence. This is further 
subdivided to relate functional failure of part connections to the functional failure of the 
component as a whole. This difference means that a functional failure on the part pair 
connection level may not necessarily lead to a functional failure in the entire component. 
Through this method, the true use of part level modelling is shown, as it allows for the 
indication of the most critical and fragile parts in a component, which will need the most 
immediate measures taken. An example of a part level FTD is shown in Figure 11. 
 Figure 11: Fault Tree Diagram at the part level 
Using FTDs in a functional model also allows, through the use of functional flows, to show 
how a failure in one component in the system will propagate throughout the system. Being 
able to predict how faults might propagate is one of the key components of fault isolation 
efficiency, and gives mechanics the ability to determine the cause of a failure much faster. 
To analyse these CMFS, their effects and criticality on a system Root Cause Analysis is 
proposed as a following step when the functional modelling process is completed. 
 
  
The tool that is used to do the root cause analysis is the Failure mode, effects, and critically 
analysis (FMECA). FMECA is a methodology to identify and analyse: 
• All potential failure modes of the various components of the system  
• The effects that these failures may have on the system  
• How to avoid the failures or/and mitigate the impact of the failures  
The steps to follow to create a FMECA report are determine the potential failure modes to 
consequently determine the effects and the causes of each failure. Then, with data obtained 
throughout use or by research, the Risk Priority number can be calculated. The RPN is a variable 
to evaluate the risks associated with the failure modes that a system contains. To determine the 
overall RPN for each issue we need to multiply:  
• Severity of each failure 
• Likelihood of occurrence for each failure 
• Likelihood of detecting the problem before it arrives at the customer  
Calculating the RPN is done by obtaining the three previous ratings is: 
 
 
In the RPN, each item is measured on a scale from 1 to 10. Consequently, the maximum value for 
the RPN is one thousand. Depending on the number obtained in the equation, it can be 
determined if the problem needs to be corrected or not. If the problem does not need a correction, 
the FMECA report is finalized. But if the problem needs a correction, the company needs to take 
appropriate corrective actions to mitigate the issue before writing the FMECA report. Examples 
of the processes that FMECA is typically used for, and that describe how these processes apply 
FMECA are shown in Figure 12and Figure 13 respectively. 
 
 
RPN= Severity x Occurrence x Detection. 
 Figure 12: Breakdown of the situations that require a FMECA 
  
SWOT analysis is a technique that helps to develop business strategy by identifying strengths, 
weaknesses, opportunities and threats. Strengths and weaknesses are internal sources, and as such 
are variable to an extent within the context of the subject of the SWOT. Whereas opportunities and 
threats are external sources and cannot be adjusted by internal means.  
The following SWOT analysis, shown in Figure 14, examines the advantages of using a model based 
FMECA instead of a traditional template: 
Figure 13: Breakdown of the applications of a FMECA 
 Figure 14: SWOT analysis comparing the proposed methodology to current maintenance practices 
 
Findings: The proposed methodology is comprised of a number of proven techniques employed 
primarily in the aerospace industry which, when used in conjunction with one another allow design 
engineers to be able to describe their to-be-designed system on a fundamental functional level. And 
assist them in assessing the highest risks within their system, further conceptualisation prototyping, as 
well as implementing preventative measures to prevent high risk failure from occurring.
•Integrates the FMECA into the functional modelling process, which is widely used 
in creating new designs.
•Allows for a consistent level of detail in the reliability analysis
•Allows for integration of field data post-creation of the model to keep the FMECA 
for each component relevant.
•Characterization of degradation will allow OEMs to increase the amount of 
prediced cylces that components will last for.
•The model based nature allows for easier adjustment of and more easy and 
consistent upkeep of FMECA data over traditional methods (such as a 
spreadsheet).
Strengths
•Requires deep understanding of functional modelling techniques/software or the 
extra time and costs of learning these skills.
•The model is only as accurate as the person that makes it, therefore there is a 
margin for error.
Weaknesses
•Has the potential to seriously reduce downtime and maintenance costs for oil 
and gas operators due to their ability to predict failure.
•The methodology can be integrated into the design process for new components 
from the start to allow engineers to more fundamentaly understand the system 
that is being worked on and integrate the functional modelling phase of the 
design process to generate a FMECA for their, saving time.
Opportunities
•Whilst better characterisation of degradation is usefull in terms of predicatbility 
and condition and performance monitoring, implementing counter measures to 
mitigate failures might not be useful for oil and gas operators, due to the need 
for all components to be EX-rated (allowed for aplication in an explosive hazard 
enviroment). The added costs of rating new equipment for this enviroment might 
make it more finanically viable to maintain the current course and not improve 
maintenance practices.
•The reluctance to share information might still be too much of hindering factor to 
allow for the creation of more reliable and detailed models of these components 
and their degradation.
Threats
Proposed database of failure concepts 
To assist in the usage of the proposed method and to enable dialogue to take place between oil 
& gas operators, OEMs and other related engineering companies, a list of failure concepts 
was compiled. The list is divided into the Causes, Mechanisms, Faults and Symptoms 
(CMFS) categories as described in chapter II, and is further sub-categorized to allow these 
different CMFS to be contextualised to specific situations, i.e. distinguishing between causes 
originating during either assembly, transport or operation. An excerpt of all four categories 
(CMFS) is shown in Table 2, the complete database is shown in Appendix B. 
This database has been reviewed and validated by TechnipFMC, an OEM of hydraulically 
actuated surface safety valves.   
 
Table 2: Excerpts of failure concept database 
Causes 
Assembly and reassembly 
Contamination 
Biological 
contamination 
A living organism that can degrade or consume a substance or component 
Corrosive 
contaminant 
An impurity that can degrade or consume a substance or component 
 
Exposure to acid The introduction of an item to a substance or gas that can cause corrosion. 
Liquid contaminant A liquid impurity that causes a substance or component to alter. 
Saline contaminant An impurity consisting of salt that causes a substance or component to alter. 
Solid particle 
contaminant 
A solid proportion of matter that causes a substance or component to alter. 
 
 
Mechanisms  
Corrosion 
Cavitation 
corrosion 
Acceleration of the corrosion process by cavitation-induced surface damage 
which continuously exposes unprotected material to a corrosive medium. 
Corrosive attack Degradation caused by the chemical reaction between two items, particularly 
metals and corrosive contaminants. 
Corrosive 
fatigue 
Accelerated corrosion of material due to fatigue cracks exposing fresh material 
to the corrosive agent. 
Corrosive wear Accelerated corrosion and wear in which wear removes corrosion protection, 
and the hard abrasive corrosion by-product that is removed acts as an abrasive 
agent. 
Crevice 
corrosion 
Localized corrosive attack by stagnant solution trapped between two surfaces 
and depleted of oxygen. 
Erosion 
corrosion 
Corrosion that is accelerated by an abrasive or viscid flow which removes 
surface materials and continuously exposes unprotected material to the 
corrosive medium. 
Pitting corrosion Localized corrosive attack that leads to the development of an array of holes or 
pits that penetrate the metal. 
Stress corrosion 
cracking 
Degradation process due to applied stress on a part in a corrosive environment, 
generating a field of localized surface cracks, usually along the grain 
boundaries.  
 
 
Faults 
Bulk change 
Cracked A crack propagated part way through the item 
Fractured A crack has entirely traversed an item and the item is completely separated into 
parts or fragmented  
Voids Empty spaces in the bulk of material 
 
 
Symptoms 
Appearance 
Shape change A change in the item geometry or shape 
Surface 
change 
A change in material surface characteristics  
 
Behaviour 
Change in 
behaviour 
A change of the component or system due to a fault 
 
  
Case study 
The importance of hydraulically actuated Surface Safety Valves to successful Xmas Tree 
operation presents a situation where detailed characterization of the degradation of 
components and parts is extremely important. To that end, the SSV is used in the validation of 
the proposed methodology to characterize these degradation phenomena and allow for 
comparison to currently used reliability assessment methods. 
Hydraulically actuated SSVs consist of three separate systems: The valve, the actuator and the 
Safety Instrumented System(SIS). These systems perform different functions but their 
cooperation is key to allowing a SSV to perform its function. As such, all three systems have 
to be taken into account when assessing degradation that can lead to SSV failure.  
 
Figure 15: Valve body exploded view (Dril-Quip, 2014) 
The valve is defined as the subsystem that regulates the flow of hydrocarbons from the 
wellhead. For SSVs a swab-gate valve is used, as the mechanism for opening and closing the 
valve needs to be able to be actuated linearly when using a hydraulic actuator. This gate 
combined with a number of seal rings, seats and retainers, as shown in Figure 15, is used to 
regulate, and if need be stop the flow to systems that are connected to the valve. 
 Figure 16: Hydraulic actuator section view (FMC Technologies, 2007) 
 
The actuator is defined as the subsystem that controls the linear movement of the gate valve 
mechanism. It is composed of a single-acting hydraulic cylinder with a spring to return the 
system to a closed position, shown in Figure 16. The use of a single acting cylinder with 
spring adds an inherent safety feature where any loss of hydraulic pressure in the actuator 
automatically closes the valve. 
The SIS is the subsystem that controls the hydraulic pressure and flow in the entire system. It 
consists of a manually operated pump to increase system pressure, with a number of relief 
valves and other safety measures to keep hydraulic pressure within the allowed margin, 
shown in Figure 17. This system also monitors hydrocarbon pressure to be able to shut the 
valve in case any situation arises where this pressure could pose a hazard to the production 
systems downstream.  
 
 
 
Figure 17: Safety Instrumented System breakdown (FMC 
Technologies, 2007) 
 
Component Function Operational conditions 
1 Manual Pump Control pressure in the 
system 
Boosting pressure 
1a Suction Filter Reduce hydraulic fluid 
contamination 
Collecting contaminations 
1b Suction Check 
Valve 
Prevent reverse flow Open during positive 
flowrate, closed during 
negative flowrate 
1c Discharge 
Check Valve 
Prevent reverse flow Open during positive 
flowrate, closed during 
negative flowrate 
2/ 2a Pressure 
Reducing Valve 
Lower pressure for 
lower pressure 
components 
Reduces pressure 
2b LP Pressure 
Relief Valve 
Protect from over 
pressurization 
Closed – normal pressure 
Open – high pressure 
2c LP Accumulator Compensate pressure for 
temperature changes 
Storing hydraulic pressure 
3 Manual Override 
Valve 
Override safety systems Closed – safety systems 
engaged 
Open – safety systems 
ignored 
3a Trip Valve Lower pressure when 
triggered 
Closed – normal 
operation 
Open – valve closed  
3b Fusible Element Cause intentional 
leakage in case of fire 
Normal operation – end 
cap function 
In case of fire – melt to 
allow for pressure 
compensation 
3c Flow Restrictor Control hydraulic flow 
rate 
Restricting flow to return 
line 
4 HP Pressure 
Relief Valve 
Protect from over 
pressurization 
Closed – normal pressure 
Open – high pressure 
5 Hydraulic 
Actuator 
Actuate the valve gate Open – valve open 
Closed – valve closed 
6 High/Low 
Pressure Pilot 
Detect high/low 
pressure in the 
hydrocarbon line 
Detecting pressure 
anomalies 
7 Solenoid Valve Allow for manual 
closing of the valve 
Closed – valve open 
Open – valve closed 
8 Hydraulic 
Reservoir 
Provide the system with 
hydraulic fluid 
Providing hydraulic fluid 
 
 
 
 
 
Because of the easy distinction between the three subsystems of an SSV this breakdown is 
used when adapting this design into a model to allow for a detailed look into the root causes 
for different failures, where failures in one subsystem can propagate throughout the others 
and affect the entire SSV. This ‘closed loop’ nature of the SSV in a functional sense is also 
why further Xmas tree components are not taken into account in this breakdown.  
Applying the methodology described in this paper to this system requires a number of 
different approaches depending on the subsystem being modelled. For the SIS, a component 
level approach is used when modelling the SIS in a Functional Block Diagram (FBD), shown 
in Figure 18, with each component performing a separate function that contributes to the 
functionality of the SIS as a whole, e.g. the hydraulic reservoir supplies fluid, and the pump 
regulates pressure.  
The valve and the actuator make use part level modelling to define how each part of these 
subsystems contribute to the required function and how the failure of each part can contribute 
to overall functional failure of the system. The valve and the actuator are taken into account in 
the complete model separately by two functional component blocks in the FBD as shown in 
Figure 19. To define this part level model, the subsystems are described through the use of 
part pair breakdowns, shown in Table 3. 
 
 Figure 18: Functional Block Diagram of the complete system  
Table 3: Part pair breakdown for the valve 
ID 
NO. 
PART NAME FEATURES NAME IN TAXONOMY 
1 Packing nut assembly Thread 
Seal ring 
Seal 
Seat 
2 Packing sub assembly Thread Seat 
Retainer 
3 Bonnet Thread Fitting 
4 Hollow hex plug Thread Plug 
5 Ring gasket  Washer 
6 Stem Thread, notch 
 
Stem 
7 Lift nut Thread Retainer 
8 Seat assembly a. Lip seal 
b. Seat ring 
c. Wave spring 
d. Face seal 
e. Seat 
Seal 
Seat 
Tension spring 
Seal 
Seat 
9 Gate guide  Guide 
10 Gate  Block 
11 Body Holes Housing 
12 Stud Thread Stud 
13 Nut Thread Nut 
 
 
ID NO FIRST PART 
NAME 
FIRST PART 
FEATURE 
SECOND PART 
NAME 
SECOND PART 
FEATURE 
1 Bonnet Thread Packing nut assembly Thread 
2 Bonnet Hole Packing sub assembly  
3 Bonnet Thread Hollow hex plug  
4 Bonnet Hole Ring gasket  
5 Bonnet Thread Stud  
6 Stem  Packing nut assembly Hole 
7 Stem Notch Packing sub assembly Hole 
8 Stem Thread Lift nut Thread 
9 Stem  Gate Hole 
10 Gate  Gate guide  
11 Seat assembly  Gate guide Hole 
12 Body Hole Seat assembly  
13 Body Thread Stud Thread 
14 Body  Bonnet  
15 Body  Ring gasket  
16 Stud Thread Nut Thread 
 
 
 Figure 19: Part level model of the valve component 
 The use of functions and flows is done purely on the component level. For this system the use 
of flows comes down mainly in the form om hydraulic energy. The function that each 
component performs in relation to these flows is also defined, as shown in Figure 20. 
 
Figure 20: Functional flow breakdown for the pump in the SIS 
The application of Failure Tree Diagrams (FTD) also differs between the SIS and the valve 
and actuator, due to the difference in modelling technique. The SIS makes use of separate 
FTDs, shown in Figure 21, for each component where the connections between components 
are defined through the propagation of the effect of a failure in a component, e.g. If a leakage 
occurs in a component, hydraulic pressure will typically drop, causing a loss of pressure 
throughout the entire system. 
Create accurate FTDs that are applicable to the different components, the database in 
Appendix B is used.  
 
Figure 21: Failure Tree Diagram for the pump in the SIS 
The valve and actuator make use of a different form of FTD, where the diagrams created for 
the different parts of the subsystem are interconnected through their interaction with other 
components where failure is defined as the failure of the function of the particular connection. 
This functional failure is then related through the use of probability and progression rates to 
the functional failure of the entire system as shown in Figure 22. This allows for the analysis 
of the relationship between failure in a specific part of the valve or actuator component, and 
functional failure throughout the entire system. 
 
Figure 22: Failure Tree Diagram for the valve 
In order to create an accurate FTD for all components in the model, the proposed database 
was used and all possible CMFSs selected that can affect different components. In order to 
assure the accuracy of these assumptions, this selection was verified by David Faichnie of 
TechnipFMC. 
To validate the accuracy of this functional model of the SSV, the model was validated by 
PHM Technology, the company responsible for the software package used in this case study. 
After validation, 
Using this model, a FMECA was created in accordance with the RPN criticality method in 
SAE and AIAG standards. The FMECA report lists the failure mode for each item in the 
system model that leads to functional failure for the valve, using the values for severity, 
detectability and occurrence set in the FTD for each component combined with probability 
and progression rates to show the probability that different faults and failures in a component 
or part cause a total system failure. 
This FMECA allows for assessment of the SSV to determine where further action needs to be 
taken. i.e. which components have the highest risk of failure and need counter measures, such 
as periodic inspection or active sensors, to ensure that failure does not occur. An excerpt of 
the FMECA is shown in Figure 23. 
Using data from actual oil & gas operations will allow for the assessment of the accuracy of 
the FMECA, a large advantage in using this method shows in the ability to adjust the different 
rankings (severity, detectability and occurrence) in accordance with the assessment to 
perpetually increase the accuracy of the report and optimize any maintenance strategies, 
sensor placement and other preventative measurements that are available.  
Comparing the results shown in this FMECA to previously made analyses throughout the 
industry proved difficult however, due to the lack of available information pertaining to 
SSVs. This, coupled with the lack of failure analysis data in general, due to the industry being 
unwilling to share this information or no data being available at all. As such, this case study 
serves more as an example of the application of this new method.   
 
Findings: Applying the new methodology as described in this paper assists in the creation of a 
detailed and adaptable functional model of a Surface Safety Valve at both the component and part 
level. Modelling techniques like this can be used for constantly updating reliability assessments, 
FMECA generation and characterization of degradation at the design stage to insure the safe 
operation of the system.  
 Figure 23: Excerpt from the FMECA of the system  
Concluding remarks 
The oil & gas industry contains a lot of opportunities for improvement in the field of failure 
analysis. Whilst reliability assessment methodologies such as FMECA are widespread 
throughout the oil and gas sector, there are still a lot of unknowns when it comes to failure of 
components and understanding the degradation that causes them to fail. 
The high costs of equipment and the reluctance to share information due to the nature of 
publicly traded companies are a major obstacles to overcome, with purposefully running 
equipment to failure to characterize their degradation not being viable to OEMs due to the 
cost of producing this equipment and operators unwilling to share the information they have 
or not having this information in the first place, discourse and cooperation between these 
companies will need to be encouraged and developed to allow for optimal implementation of 
the methodology proposed in this paper. 
In unifying the multiple industry definitions for Causes, Mechanisms, Faults and Symptoms, 
this paper hopes to improve dialogue between oil & gas operators and Original Equipment 
Manufacturers about failure rates, causes maintenance concepts and overall reliability and 
safety. 
Current maintenance practises are adequate for safety standards. They do, however, leave 
much to be desired in the optimisation of wellhead use and minimalizing the costs related to 
downtime and replacement parts. Current reporting methods are very surface level, leaving 
OEMs with little information as to the degradation of their components. 
The proposed method to implement these new definitions, along with the compiled database 
hopes to improve the ability of the industry to characterize and predict degradation at the 
design stage. Using well known techniques such as Functional Block Diagrams, part level 
modelling and Fault Tree Diagrams gives engineers a versatile selection of tools to analyse a 
system and simulate degradation without the added costs that in the field run-to-failure testing 
would bring. The validation of this method through its popular current use in the aerospace 
industry in such projects such as the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter also bodes well for the 
implementation of this method in other sectors.  
From the SWOT analysis it can be seen that the proposed methodology offers a number of 
advantages over traditional methods, particularly in the field of long term reliability analysis. 
The ability to more easily and reliably adjust FMECA reports over time through the use of the 
same model, and the advantages that a consistent level of detail of a report offers will 
hopefully entice OEMs to embrace the proposed methodology in the future. 
Current issues that the proposed method will have to overcome mainly pertain to the current 
reluctance of oil & gas companies to share data, this is understandable given that making such 
data publicly available can influence stock prices negatively. Any data that is currently 
available, such as OREDA and the database released by Equinor are either fairly limited or 
difficult to interpret due to the scattered nature of this raw dataset. The further interpretation 
and cataloguing of this dataset might significantly improve the ability of the oil & gas 
industry to characterize degradation in their systems over longer periods of time. Convincing 
the industry to adopt the database of failure concepts and then applying it to the different 
components in the industry will require time and effort on the part of both OEMs and 
operators. 
This lack of data also had a great influence in the validation of the FMECA that was 
generated as a result of the case study, with the case study resulting more so in a worked 
example of the proposed method and to prove the ability of this method to generate a 
FMECA, instead of validation of the FMECA generated through this method. However, due 
to the popular application of this method in the aerospace industry, validation of the method is 
achieved nonetheless outside of the scope of this paper. 
Further research will be done on this subject to provide a proper oil & gas industry validation 
of this method and to hopefully incite the oil & gas industry to adopt new techniques and 
technologies to improve the efficiency, safety and reliability of their systems. 
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Appendix 
Appendix A – Part Pair breakdown for the valve and actuator components of the Surface Safety Valve 
Valve parts and part pairs 
 
ID 
NO. 
PART NAME FEATURES NAME IN TAXONOMY 
1 Packing nut assembly Thread 
Seal ring 
Seal 
Seat 
2 Packing sub assembly Thread Seat 
Retainer 
3 Bonnet Thread Fitting 
4 Hollow hex plug Thread Plug 
5 Ring gasket  Washer 
6 Stem Thread, notch 
 
Stem 
7 Lift nut Thread Retainer 
8 Seat assembly f. Lip seal 
g. Seat ring 
h. Wave spring 
i. Face seal 
j. Seat 
Seal 
Seat 
Tension spring 
Seal 
Seat 
9 Gate guide  Guide 
10 Gate  Block 
11 Body Holes Housing 
12 Stud Thread Stud 
13 Nut Thread Nut 
 
 
ID NO FIRST PART 
NAME 
FIRST PART 
FEATURE 
SECOND PART 
NAME 
SECOND PART 
FEATURE 
1 Bonnet Thread Packing nut assembly Thread 
2 Bonnet Hole Packing sub assembly  
3 Bonnet Thread Hollow hex plug  
4 Bonnet Hole Ring gasket  
5 Bonnet Thread Stud  
6 Stem  Packing nut assembly Hole 
7 Stem Notch Packing sub assembly Hole 
8 Stem Thread Lift nut Thread 
9 Stem  Gate Hole 
10 Gate  Gate guide  
11 Seat assembly  Gate guide Hole 
12 Body Hole Seat assembly  
13 Body Thread Stud Thread 
14 Body  Bonnet  
15 Body  Ring gasket  
16 Stud Thread Nut Thread 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hydraulic Actuator parts and part pairs 
 
ID 
NO. 
PART NAME FEATURES NAME IN TAXONOMY 
1 Piston  Piston 
2 Cylinder Hole Cylinder 
3 Upper piston seal  Seal 
4 Lower piston seal  Seal 
5 Spring  Torsion spring 
6 Upper spring retainer Hole Retainer 
7 Lower spring retainer Hole Retainer 
8 Drift adjuster Notch Guide 
9 Housing Thread Housing 
10 Cylinder bolts Thread Bolt 
11 Housing bolts Thread Bolt 
 
ID NO FIRST PART 
NAME 
FIRST PART 
FEATURE 
SECOND PART NAME SECOND PART 
FEATURE 
1 Housing  Lower spring retainer  
2 Housing Thread Housing bolts Thread 
3 Housing  Spring  
4 Housing Thread Cylinder bolts thread 
5 Housing  Hole Cylinder   
6 Spring  Upper spring retainer  
7 Spring  Lower spring retainer  
8 Piston  Drift adjuster Notch 
9 Piston  Upper piston seal Hole 
10 Piston  Lower piston seal Hole 
11 Cylinder  Upper piston seal  
12 Cylinder  Lower piston seal  
13 Cylinder Thread Cylinder bolts thread 
 
  
  
  
 Appendix B – Complete database of failure concepts 
Causes 
Assembly and reassembly 
Contamination 
Corrosive 
contaminant 
An impurity that can degrade or consume a substance or component 
 
Exposure to acid The introduction of an item to a substance or gas that can cause corrosion. 
Liquid contaminant A liquid impurity that causes a substance or component to alter. 
Saline contaminant An impurity consisting of salt that causes a substance or component to alter. 
Solid particle 
contaminant 
A solid proportion of matter that causes a substance or component to alter. 
 
 
Environmental protection 
Damaged surface 
protection 
The outer preservation or layer of an item is comprised. 
 
 
Geometry 
Blocked opening A congested inlet caused by incorrect assembly. 
Disconnected A separation of the connection between two or more items. 
Dynamic 
imbalance 
An imbalance caused by the center of mass being out of alignment with the 
center of rotation. 
Excessive 
clearance 
A gap that allows relative movement and is larger than needed. 
Insufficient 
clearances 
A gap that allows relative movement is too small for intended purpose. 
Loose fit An item that is unsecured or can move about freely. 
Mechanical 
interference 
A disruption between the connection of two mating physical items. 
Misaligned An item is having an incorrect position or orientation in an assembly. 
Tight fit An item that is overly secure or restricted movement. 
Wrong part 
orientation 
A part has been placed into an item with incorrect alignment. 
 
Humidity 
High humidity An excessive amount of moisture. 
 
Material quality 
Surface damage The exterior destruction of an item. 
 
 
Mechanical loading 
High mechanical 
load 
A higher than expected mechanical force is exerted on an item. 
Impact loads A force exerted on an item that is generated by a moving object. 
 
Mechanical property 
Weak bond The adhesive strength of a bond between items is lower than expected. 
 
Design 
Chemical property 
Chemically 
reactive material 
The tendency of a substance to undergo a chemical reaction. 
 
Environmental protection 
Insufficient 
environmental 
constraints 
A lack of or inadequate sealing between internal environments. 
Insufficient surface 
protection 
A lack of or inadequate exterior preservation for an item. 
 
Geometry 
Blocked opening A congested inlet caused by design errors. 
Disconnected A separation of the connection between two or more items. 
Excessive 
clearances 
A gap that allows movement and is larger than needed. 
Inappropriate flow 
geometry 
The geometric design of the system does not allow the ideal flow. 
Incorrect size The item sizing is to large or too small for intended purpose. 
Insufficient 
clearances 
A gap that allows relative movement is too small for intended purpose. 
Loose fit An item that is unsecured or can move about freely. 
Misaligned An item having an incorrect position or orientation in an assembly. 
Possesses curvature An item has been designed with more curvature than is necessary. 
Stress 
concentrations 
A localization and amplification of stress at a particular point of an item. 
Tight fit An item is overly secure or restricted in movement. 
Wrong part 
orientation 
A part has been placed into an item with incorrect alignment. 
 
Material quality 
Incorrect material 
composition 
The materials selected have an inaccurate formation for intended purpose. 
 
 Mechanical loading 
Residual stress A stress present in an object that was caused by a previous loading or 
process. 
 
Mechanical property 
Brittle material The tendency to break without significant deformation. 
Hardness mismatch The ability to restrict plastic deformation substantially differs between two 
connected items. 
Insufficient 
stiffness 
An item has inadequate or poor rigidity. 
Soft material An item is susceptible to being deformed by external loads. 
Stiffness mismatch The rigidity substantially differs between two connected items. 
Thermal coefficient 
mismatch 
The thermal resistance substantially differs between two connected items. 
Weak material The material has a lower yield strength than its operating load. 
Wrong coefficient 
of thermal 
expansion 
The incorrect correlation between geometry and thermal temperature of an 
item. 
 
 
Operational capacity 
Cannot withstand 
operational loads 
The maximum load or force the item can endure is inadequate for usage. 
Insufficient 
capacity 
The maximum volume or weight the item can store is inadequate for usage. 
 
  
Maintenance 
Contamination 
Chemically 
reactive 
contaminant 
An impurity that results in a substance or components to undergo a chemical 
change. 
Corrosive 
contaminant 
An impurity that can degrade or consume a substance or component. 
Exposure to acid The introduction of an item to a substance or gas that can cause corrosion. 
Gaseous 
contaminant 
A vapour impurity that causes a substance or component to alter. 
Ionic contaminant A residue or harmful material that is left behind during a manufacturing 
process. 
Liquid 
contaminant 
A liquid impurity that causes a substance or component to alter. 
Saline 
contaminant 
An impurity consisting of salt that causes a substance or component to alter. 
Solid particle 
contaminants 
A solid portion of matter that causes a substance or component to alter. 
 
Environmental protection 
Damaged surface 
protection 
The outer preservation or layer of an item is compromised. 
 
Humidity 
High humidity An excessive amount of moisture. 
 
Input 
Incompatible 
input material 
A substance or component used during maintenance is incorrect and will not 
function within the system. 
Incorrect 
lubricant 
The wrong type of coating was used to reduce surface friction. 
 
Material quality 
Surface damage The exterior destruction of an item. 
 
Mechanical loading 
Impact loads A force exerted on an item that is generated by a moving object. 
 
 
 
Procedure 
Insufficient 
cleaning 
An inadequate amount of sanitation has been used. 
Mishandling Improper handling of a component, leading to damage. 
Untimely 
inspections 
The monitoring tasks performed to check health are not conducted frequently 
enough. 
Untimely 
maintenance 
actions 
The maintenance tasks performed to restore item health are not conducted 
frequently enough. 
 
Manufacturing 
Chemical property 
Chemically 
reactive material 
The tendency of a substance to undergo a chemical reaction. 
 
Contamination 
Chemically 
reactive 
contaminant 
An impurity that results in a substance or components to undergo a chemical 
change. 
Corrosive 
contaminant 
An impurity that can degrade or consume a substance or component. 
Exposure to acid The introduction of an item to a substance or gas that can cause corrosion. 
Gaseous 
contaminant 
A vapour impurity that causes a substance or component to alter. 
Ionic contaminant A residue of a harmful material is left behind during a manufacturing process. 
Liquid 
contaminant 
A liquid impurity that causes a substance or component to alter. 
Saline 
contaminant 
An impurity consisting of salt that causes a substance of component to alter. 
Solid particle 
contaminants 
A solid portion of matter that causes a substance or component to alter. 
 
Environmental protection 
Insufficient 
surface protection 
A lack of or inadequate exterior preservation for an item. 
 
 
  
Geometry 
Excessive 
clearances 
A gap that allows relative movement and is larger than needed. 
Inappropriate 
flow geometry 
The geometric design of the system does not allow the ideal flow. 
Incorrect size The item sizing is to large or too small for intended purpose. 
Insufficient 
clearances 
An item is unsecured or can move about freely. 
 
Possesses 
curvature 
An item has been designed with more curvature than is necessary. 
Stress 
concentrations 
A localization of stress at a particular point of an item. 
 
 
Humidity 
High humidity An excessive amount of moisture. 
 
Material quality 
Crystal defects Issues with crystalline structure of an item, impacting on the properties of the 
material. 
Excessive 
material defects 
An unacceptable amount of deformities in an item. 
Incorrect material 
defects 
The materials selected have an inaccurate formation for intended purpose. 
Material contains 
inclusion 
The presence of small foreign items that alter the material quality. 
Presence of voids The occurrence of small interstices on the interior of an item, potentially 
altering them material properties. 
Rough surface The exterior of an item is coarse or ridged. 
Smooth surface The exterior of an item is continuous or invariable. 
 
Mechanical loading  
Residual stress A stress present in an object that was caused by a previous loading or process. 
 
  
Mechanical property 
Brittle material The tendency to break without significant deformation. 
Hardness 
mismatch 
The ability to resist plastic deformation substantially differs between two 
connected items. 
Insufficient 
stiffness 
- An item has inadequate or poor rigidity. 
Soft material An item is susceptible to being deformed by external loads. 
Stiffness 
mismatch 
The rigidity substantially differs between two connected items. 
Weak material The material has a lower yield strength than its operating load. 
Wrong coefficient 
of thermal 
expansion 
The incorrect correlation between geometry and thermal temperature of an 
item. 
 
Metallization defect 
Etching defects A coating is performed leaving impression flaws on the item. 
Inadequate step 
coverage 
A coating is performed in poor vacuum resulting in non-uniform trends. 
Incorrect 
alignment 
A coating is performed at an incorrect angle or orientation. 
Incorrect 
composition 
A coating is performed with inaccurate material constituents. 
Incorrect 
thickness 
A coating is performed of inaccurate depth. 
Line width A coating is performed with inaccurate width. 
Poor adhesion A coating is performed with an insufficient bond strength. 
Scratching A coating is performed resulting in abrasive flaws on the item. 
Thin oxide layer A coating is performed with an inaccurate oxide layer depth. 
Voids in oxides The presence of gaps in the oxide layer of a coating. 
 
Operation 
Ambient pressure 
High pressure The ambient pressure is higher than expected. 
Low pressure The ambient pressure is lower than expected. 
Pressure 
differential 
The range between maximum and minimum pressure experienced is different 
to expected. 
Pressure 
fluctuations 
Variations in ambient pressure that effect an item. 
 
  
Contamination 
Chemically 
reactive 
contaminant 
An impurity that results in a substance or components to undergo a chemical 
reaction. 
Corrosive 
contaminant 
An impurity that can degrade or consume a substance or component. 
Exposure to acid The introduction to an item to a substance or gas that can cause corrosion. 
Gaseous 
contaminant 
A vapour impurity that causes a substance or component to alter. 
Liquid 
contaminant 
A liquid impurity that causes a substance or component to alter. 
Solid particle 
contaminants 
A solid portion of matter that causes a substance or component to alter 
 
Environmental protection 
Damaged surface 
protection 
The outer preservation or layer of an item is comprised. 
 
Hydraulic loading 
Transient 
hydraulic loads 
Short lived bursts of random hydraulic loads. 
 
Input 
Aerated liquid 
input 
A material inlet flow is made effervescent by being charged with carbon oxide 
or other gas. 
Contaminated 
input flow 
An incoming flow is comprised by impurity. 
High pressure 
input flow 
An incoming flow that is generating a higher than expected pressure. 
Incorrect timing 
of input flow 
An incoming flow has an incorrect or different pacing to what was expected. 
Input flow too 
fast 
An incoming flow has a higher than expected rate of flow. 
Input flow too 
slow 
An incoming flow has a lower than expected rate of flow. 
Low pressure 
input flow 
An incoming flow that is generating a lower than expected pressure. 
Moist input flow An incoming flow has a high humidity. 
 
  
Mechanical loading 
Acceleration An increase in speed or rate. 
Cyclic 
mechanical loads 
A series of repeated forces or loadings. 
High mechanical 
loads 
A higher than expected mechanical force is exerted on an item. 
Impact loads A force exerted on an item that is generated by a moving object. 
Mechanical shock A sudden acceleration due to impact. 
Transient 
mechanical loads 
Short lived bursts of random mechanical loads. 
Vibration loading A continual and oscillating loading on an item. 
 
 
Operating procedure 
Dry start An item is operated without proper priming or lubrication. 
Shut-down 
procedures 
breached 
The end of the operation process is performed incorrectly. 
Start-up 
procedures 
breached 
The beginning of operation process is performed incorrectly. 
 
Operating speed 
High operating 
speed 
The operating speed of an item is higher than expected. 
Low operating 
speed 
The operating speed of an item is lower than expected. 
 
Operating time 
Item life-span 
exceeded 
The long-term life expectancy has been surpassed. 
Maximum 
continuous use 
time exceeded 
The short-term usage for an item has been surpassed. 
 
Pneumatic loading 
Cyclic pneumatic 
loads 
A series of repeated pressure changes in a pneumatic flow. 
High pneumatic 
load 
A gas is generating a higher than expected pressure or rate. 
Low pneumatic 
loads 
A gas that is generating a lower than expected pressure or rate. 
 
 
Transportation 
Contamination 
Chemically 
reactive 
contaminant 
An impurity that results in a substance or components to undergo chemical 
change. 
Corrosive 
contaminant 
An impurity that can degrade or consume a substance or component. 
Exposure to acid The introduction of an item to a substance or gas that can cause corrosion. 
Gaseous 
contaminant 
A vapour impurity that causes a substance or component to alter. 
Ionic contaminant Residue or harmful material that is left behind during a manufacturing process. 
Liquid 
contaminant 
A liquid that causes a substance or component to alter. 
Saline 
contaminant 
An impurity consisting salt that causes a substance or component to alter. 
Solid particle 
contaminants 
A solid portion of matter that causes a substance or component to alter. 
 
Environmental protection 
Damaged surface 
protection 
The outer preservation or layer of an item is compromised. 
 
 
Humidity 
High humidity An excessive amount of moisture. 
 
Material quality 
Surface damage The exterior destruction of an item. 
 
Mechanical loading 
Impact loads A force exerted on an item that is generated by a moving object. 
Vibration loading A continual and oscillating loading on an item. 
 
  
Mechanisms 
Corrosion 
Cavitation 
corrosion 
Acceleration of the corrosion process by cavitation-induced surface damage 
which continuously exposes unprotected material to a corrosive medium. 
Corrosive attack Degradation caused by the chemical reaction between two items, particularly 
metals and corrosive contaminants. 
Corrosive 
fatigue 
Accelerated corrosion of material due to fatigue cracks exposing fresh material 
to the corrosive agent. 
Corrosive wear Accelerated corrosion and wear in which wear removes corrosion protection, 
and the hard abrasive corrosion by-product that is removed acts as an abrasive 
agent. 
Crevice 
corrosion 
Localized corrosive attack by stagnant solution trapped between two surfaces 
and depleted of oxygen. 
Erosion 
corrosion 
Corrosion that is accelerated by an abrasive or viscid flow which removes 
surface materials and continuously exposes unprotected material to the 
corrosive medium. 
Pitting corrosion Localized corrosive attack that leads to the development of an array of holes or 
pits that penetrate the metal. 
Stress corrosion 
cracking 
Degradation process due to applied stress on a part in a corrosive environment, 
generating a field of localized surface cracks, usually along the grain 
boundaries.  
 
Elastic deformation  
Bending 
deformation 
Deformation of a body under bending loading. 
Buckling A sudden collapse of a member under ‘column’ compression load due to elastic 
instability. 
Compression 
deformation 
Deformation of a body under compression loads, which results in contraction of 
the body in one dimension. 
Shear 
deformation 
Deformation of a body under shear loading, characterized by the relative sliding 
of planar sections of the material. 
Tensile 
deformation 
Elastic extension of a part under the action of a tensile load. 
 
Fatigue 
High cycle 
fatigue 
Crack initiation and growth due to cyclic application of stresses or strains that 
extend mainly into elastic range, with failure occurring after 50,000 cycles. 
Impact fatigue Growth of cracks due to repetitive impact loading. 
Low cycle 
fatigue 
Crack initiation and progression caused by the cyclic application of stresses or 
strains that extend into plastic range of produce failure in about 10,000 cycles or 
less. 
 
  
Fracture 
Brittle fracture  Fracture characterized by no apparent plastic deformation prior to rupture. 
Ductile fracture Fracture characterized by extensive plastic deformation prior to complete 
rupture. 
Impact fracture High stresses and strains due to impact which cause separation of a part into two 
or more pieces. 
Shear fracture Fracture characterized by the relative sliding of planar surfaces of the material. 
Tearing A tensile failure in thin materials characterized by a fracture initiating at one 
edge and propagating across. 
Tensile fracture Fracture characterized by the axial extension of the material and separation of 
the broken parts. 
 
Material decomposition 
Coking The thermal decomposition of a hydrocarbon liquid into a solid mass of impure 
carbon. 
 
Material degradation 
Embrittlement Reduction of ductility/toughness in a metal or plastic with negligible change in 
other mechanical properties.  
Oxidation The reaction of a material with oxygen to form an oxide compound. 
 
Material transfer 
Build-up of 
debris 
Deposition and accumulation of solid contaminants. 
Silting  The deposition of particulate contaminants from a flowing liquid medium. 
 
Plastic deformation 
Creep Accumulation of plastic deformation in a part over a period of time under the 
influence of stress and temperature, causing excessive deformation or rupture. 
Creep buckling Accumulation of plastic deformation due to a combination of compression 
loading and high temperatures over a period of time, that results in buckling 
instability of the material. 
Stress relaxation Non-linear material behaviour in which stress is relieved under constant strain. 
Yielding Plastic deformation of a part caused by the imposed operational loads or strains. 
 
  
State change  
Heat loss Energy or power transmitted out of the system in the form of heat. 
Micro-dieseling Adiabatic compression of air bubbles in aerated oil under high pressure and 
temperature, resulting in very high localized temperatures and thermal 
degradation of the oil. 
  
Wear 
Abrasive wear The loss of material from a solid surface due to abrasion by hard particles or 
protuberances. 
Deformation 
wear 
Growth of surface cracks, due to repeated plastic deformation, that coalesce to 
form wear particles. 
Erosion  The wearing action of an abrasive or viscid fluid or gas on an exposed surface, 
which results in removal of material from exposed surface. 
Fretting wear Wear that occurs at the contact area between two materials under load and 
subject to minute relative motion by vibration or some other force. 
Surface fatigue 
wear 
Cyclic shear stress produced in the subsurface material leading to crack growth 
causing the loss of surface material. 
 
 
 
  
Faults 
Bulk change 
Cracked A crack propagated part way through the item 
Fractured A crack has entirely traversed an item and the item is completely separated into 
parts or fragmented  
Voids Empty spaces in the bulk of material 
 
Fluid property change 
Contaminated A fluid contains undesirable, foreign liquid or solid materials 
 
Mechanical connection 
Blocked The clearance between two items is filled by a foreign material, preventing the 
flow of material between them 
Disconnected The clearance between to items is increased, preventing mechanical interactions 
between them 
Geometric 
property 
mismatch 
The mechanical property of an item is changed, generating mechanical 
interactions between it and another item 
Interference The clearance between two items is decreased, enabling mechanical interactions 
between them 
Loose The clearance between two items is increased, allowing undesired relative motion 
between them 
Misaligned The relative position or attitude of an item has changed 
Seized The clearance between two items is decreased, preventing relative motion 
between them 
Separated The clearance between two items is increased, allowing the flow of material 
between them 
Tight The clearance between two items is decreased, generating excessive normal 
forces between them 
 
Mechanical property 
Brittle The resistance of an item to brittle fractures is decreased 
Plastic The resistance of an item to irreversible mechanical deformation is decreased 
Stiffness 
reduced 
The resistance of an item to elastic deformation is decreased 
Weakened The resistance of an item to ductile fracture is decreased 
 
  
Operator faults 
Action fault The operator’s actions were insufficient to bring about the desired consequences 
Attention fault The trigger information was presented to the operator but not noticed by him/her 
Decision fault The operator made a wrong choice in an undetermined situation 
Intention fault The operator knew what action to perform, but omitted to perform the action 
Perception 
fault 
The trigger information was presented but not noticed or understood by the 
operator 
Reasoning 
fault 
The operator falsely concluded what his/her action should be 
 
Shape change 
Bent An initially straight item possesses curvature 
Buckled An initially straight item is permanently bent out of shape to the point of 
structural instability 
Dimensions 
changed 
Dimension change making item(s) unsuitable for its intended duty 
Expanded Item is deformed in more than one direction such that its volume is increased 
Extruded Item is deformed according to the shape of the opening through which it has been 
pushed 
Sheared The item is deformed such that parallel planes are translated with respect to each 
other 
Stretched Item is deformed such that its length is increased 
Twisted Item is deformed about on axis such that one end is rotated relative to the other 
 
Surface change 
Abraded Outer layer of surface material has been removed, and lower layers of the same 
material have been exposed 
Chipped Loss of surface material leaving shallow, rounded voids 
Corroded The outer layer of an item has been chemically removed by a corrosive agent 
Etched Localized areas of the outer layer of an item have been chemically removed 
Grooved Surface material has been locally removed or deformed 
Oxidized The outer layer of an item has reacted with oxygen and is an oxide compound 
Pitted Loss of surface material leaving deep, rounded voids 
Porous Surface material contains voids 
Rough The outer layer is unevenly deformed and possesses peaks and valleys 
Ruptured A tear in the item, result of breaking open or bursting 
Scratched Surface material has been locally removed or deformed 
Stripped Generalized loss of surface material, exposing a surface layer to different material 
Surface cracks Surface layer of material is fractured 
 
  
Symptoms 
Appearance 
Shape change A change in the item geometry or shape 
Surface 
change 
A change in material surface characteristics  
 
Behaviour 
Change in 
behaviour 
A change of the component or system due to a fault 
 
Energy 
Airborne noise An acoustic emission that propagates through a fluid 
Fluid borne 
noise 
An acoustic emission that propagates through a fluid 
Vibration A change in vibration caused by normal or abnormal system operation 
 
Environment 
Change in 
environment 
An emission or loss from the system that leads to an alteration of some aspect of 
the external environment 
 
Material 
Leakage An accidental emission of a liquid or gas caused by a fault 
Solid debris And emission of debris that is formed by the act of erosion or wear 
 
Other 
Other A generic change in emission from a fault or flow 
 
Performance 
Change in 
performance 
A loss in the item that manifests by changing a measured performance variable 
 
